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LEATHER BUYING OF SHOE MANUFACTURERS:
PATTERNS AND PROCEDURES
As fluctuation in the buying of retailers moves toward
earlier stages it can be augmented or damped by the
operations of shoe manufacturers. Manufacturers' pur-
chasing of leather from tanners can undergo greater or
lesser, earlier or later fluctuation than that of their
selling—which is, of course, the buying of shoe dis-
tributors.
To learn what actually takes place, we turn first to
monthly time series on shoe manufacturers' selling,
buying, productinn, and accumulation of stock on hand
and on order. Next, we examine the objectives, proce-
dures, and limiting circumstances that lie behind be-
havior. We try to learn how the problem of procure-
ment is conceived, structured, and incorporated in
management techniques, and what facts of the environ-
ment also shape the final patterns of leather buying of
shoe manufactures.
Fluctuations in Production, Receipts of
Leather, and Inventory Investment
We do not have statistics on the selling and buying
of shoe manufacturers (orders received and placed),
so three major compromises are required. First, lack-
ing information on orders, we rely mainly on statistics
of output and receipts of raw material, constantly
watching how results are affected by this expedient.
Second, lacking information on purchases of shoe
manufacturers alone, we use purchases of all manu-
facturers of leather goods. Since during the interwar
period shoe manufacturers used, on the average, about
90 per cent of all cattle-hide leather, this is a minor
compromise.' Further, with the exception of leather
belting (this averaged less than 4 per cent of the total
and was of diminishing importance), most of the other
uses are in consumer-goods lines (luggage, upholstery,
bags, and ornaments); their consumption may have
a similar direction, if not the same extent of change,
as the consumption of shoes. Third, in order to simplify
analysis at the tanning stage, we concentrate on only
'See Commodities in Industry, the 1940 Commodity Year
Book, prepared and published by Commodity Research Bureau,
Inc., for a convenient summary of the several uses of domestic
output of cattle-hide leathers.
one of the many sorts of leather purchased by leather-
goods manufacturers—leather made from the hides of
more or less adult neat cattle, which constituted about
65 per cent of the leather used in shoes.
Assuming, then, that the data may, in eflect, be
used as part of a• continuous vertical series in which
shoe distribution is also a member, we study Ipatterns
of output and those of input for the most important
material of which the final product is comiposed—
cattle-hide leather. Chart 23 shows three important
time series all measured in units of equivalent hides;
note that "cattle-hide" is omitted from the
of leather series in all charts and tables and like-
wise in most of the text. The series in Chart 23 are:
leather consumption (the amount of cattle-hide leather
converted each month into finished goods); receipts
(the amount of cattle-hide leather received each
month by leather-goods manufacturers); and inven-
tory investment (the change between the beginning-
and end-of-month stocks of "raw" or in-process leather
held by leather-goods manufacturers).
A word on the construction of the series before turn-
ing to what they seem to say. The domestic consump-
tion of cattle-hide leather is seasonally adjusted shoe
production multiplied by a centered eighteen-month
moving average of the ratio of the amount of cattle-
hide leather used by all leather-goods manufacturers
to the number of pairs of shoes Leather
receipts are the shipments of leather by tanners to
leather-goods manufacturers and dealers. Time in
transit is short and relatively uniform for a given area.
Consequently, the same figures can be studiedi either
as shipments or as receipts, and we shift the title with
the context.3 Since tanners ship leather to foreign mar-
kets and domestic dealers, as well as to leather-goods
manufacturers, the coverage of the statistics is not
ideal for the purpose of this chapter, but their defects
are probably not serious. I estimate that roughly four-
fifths of the total went to domestic leather-goods manu-
2Thisseries was constructed in preference to the leather-
consumption statistics prepared at the Tanners' Council, though
with the aid of their material. For detailed description see
Appendix B, series 45.
We are greatly indebted to the Tanners' Council for the
use of these very important unpublished data.236 CHAPTER11
CHART23
Leather-Goods Manufacturers' Leather Consumption, Inventory Investment, and Receipts, 1921—1940
Specific-subcycte peaks and troughs (broken and solid vertical lines) in consumption (series 45 in Appendix B) are used as reference frame.
For the other series, specific-cycle turns are marked by X and specific-sub cycle turns by 0. Cycle and subcycle turns in inventory investment have not
been differentiated. When a specific turn is matched with a turn in the reference series, a horizontal line or vertical arrow indicates the association.
The moving average is centered. Parenthetic figures after names of series identify their descriptions in Appendix B. "Leather consumption," "receipts,"
and "inventory investment" refer here as elsewhere to cattle-hide leather only. Also, measures given in "hides" are leather equivalents of a hide.
facturers and perhaps three-quarters of the total to
shoe
Inveniory investment is monthly consumption sub-
tracted from receipts after net exports of cattle-hide
leather have been allowed for. The figures therefore
4 The Census of Business, Vol. V, tabulates information on
Distribution of Manufacturers' Sales: 1939. Of the total sales
and interplant transfer of leather manufacturers (tanners), ex-
ports of leather amount to about 3 per cent, sales to jobbers and
wholesalers 15 per cent, and sales to leather-goods manufacturers
the other 82 per cent. Assuming that about 90 per cent of the
last figure is to shoe manufacturers, they would receive about
74 per cent of the total output of tanners. There appears no
special reason why 1939 would be an atypical year.
The series could have been ajusted for exports, since for
this we do have monthly statistics. But had this been done, a
double set of all standard measures would have been required
for receipts of leather-goods manufacturers (excluding exports)
and shipments of tanners (including exports), and the small
size of exports would have made these operations a mere
formality.
include inventory investment of dealers in leather as
well as of manufacturers of leather goods. Inventories
of dealers may have quite a different subcyclical pat-
tern than those of manufacturers, but they represent
a very small portion of the total—perhaps around 15
per cent.5
There were 829 service and limited-function wholesalers
listed in the Census of Wholesale Trade, 1939 reporting sales
of leather and cut stock. Although this group did not reVort the
value (at cost) of their end-of-year inventories, the total 'leather
and shoe findings" group did; I estimate that the total inventories
of those selling leather or cut stock was about $18.2 million.
Of course, we do not know how much of this was leather and
cut stock.
The Census of Manufacturers; 1939 likewise gives inventories
of materials, supplies, etc., of leather-goods manufacturers, and
these sum to $99.4 million. Here, again, we do not know what
proportion of the total is leather and cut stock, but on the
assumption that the proportions are the same for wholesalers and
manufacturers, the former carry 15.5 per cent of the total
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In the chart, several facts stand out:
1. Consumption and receipts of cattle-hide leather
in leather-goods manufacturing plants follow a closely
parallel course through the years. Naturally this could
hardly be otherwise over major swings unless huge
changes in leather inventories were to occur. But it
is true of the minor movements too; all but one of the
twenty-six turns marked in consumption between 1922
and 1940 are matched, under our timing rules, with
turns in receipts.
2. The correspondence between receipts and con-
.sumption seems to include a tendency for receipts to
reach peaks and troughs a month or so earlier. Allow-
ing for an average lead of one month, only 22 per
cent of the months are in unlike As we shall see
in a moment, there is a good reason why receipts of
shoe manufacturers lead consumption by this slight
interval, whereas those of retailers largely synchronized
with sales.
3. The pattern of the raw material (leather) enter-
ing a shoe factory appears to have somewhat wider
subcyclical fluctuations than the flow off production
floors. Since the manufacturer would have more inter-
•est in smoothing his own work flow than that of his
suppliers, this is not surprising. The extent of the dif-
ference is given in our measures of speciflc-subcycle
amplitude. The fluctuation per month expressed as a
per cent of the average value of the series is 3.70 for
receipts and 2.11 for consumption.
4. Monthly changes in leather-goods manufacturers'
stock of leather, raw and in process, also underwent
subcycical fluctuation. This can be seen either in the
monthly figures (receipts minus consumption) or in
their outlines smoothed by a centered five-month mov-
ing average. As might be expected, these fluctuations
bear a far closer similarity to those of receipts (twenty-
nine turns are matched) than to those of consump-
tion (eighteen turns are matched).
5. Comparison of the turns in this series with turns
in consumption as shown in the vertical grid indicates
that inventory investment of shoe manufacturers, un-
like that of retailers, tends to reach peaks and troughs
several months ahead of the outward flow of finished
goods. Moreover, the lead is likewise apparent, though
stock. This happens to be about the same figure as the amount
of tanners' sales of leather to wholesalers and dealers taken as a
percentage of their total sales. Incidentally, the materials, supplies,
etc., carried by leather-goods manufacturers other than foot-
wear manufacturers (and boot and shoe cut-stock manufacturers)
amounted also to 15.5 per cent of the total.
6Thecorrespondence between consumption and receipts of
upper leather is, according to our measures, a little closer than
for sole and 30 per cent, respectively, are in opposite
phase after allowing for a one-month lead. Other facts that we
shall encounter also suggest that a difference may be present and
why.
less emphasized, in the relation between inventory
investment and receipts; allowing for a lead ininvest-
ment of one month, 21 per cent of the months in the
two series are in unlike phase. The corresponding fig-
ureinventory investment and leather consumption,
after allowing for a lead of two months, is 30 per cent.
6. The presence of conforming subcycles in inven-
tory investment does not mean, as it did in retail stores,
that the maximum fluctuations in flow out of the enter-
prise will be augmented in the flow into the enter-
prise. Study of the chart specifically at the months of
peaks and troughs in consumption shows inventory
investment to be often small or even negative at those
times. This results in part from the leading of
inventory investment. Table 41 provides the measure
toward which the eye strives. In the first section, at
the foot of column 4, change in inventory investment
is seen to be negligible, on the average, betweøn peaks
and troughs in the flow of finished shoes off production
floors. Consequently, judged in terms of the physical
presence of merchandise (not merchandise on order),
there is no amplitude acceleration of derived demand
at the stage where finished shoes are manufactured.
The first half of Table 42 shows that this statement
applies to long or short subcycles or to all or selected
major cycles. For each of the five sorts of dassffica-
tions the amplitude of inventory investment was neg-
ligible compared with the amplitude of consumption.
However, there is a timing acceleration due to the
early turns of inventory investment, and this iS of con-
siderable practical and theoretical interest.
But if attention focuses not on the time that physical
output of shoes reaches maxima or minima, but on
other times—say, when producers hear and perhaps
first react to changes in demand—then the figures
show that an amplitude effect may well be present.
Peaks and troughs in receipts of leather by leather-
goods manufacturers are certainly higher or Occur at
different times, or both, than would be the case were
there no fluctuations in their inventory investment.
This is evident in the second half of Table 41, where
fluctuations in inventory investment are recorded be-
tween months when peaks and troughs in receipts
rather than in consumption took place. The additional
excitation associated with inventory investment is
felt in tanneries as shipments are prepared. Measured
at peaks and troughs in receipts, inventory investment
of shoe manufacturers shows an average
which is about half again as large as that of consump-
tion. In other words, alterations in the flow of finished
shoes off factory floors contribute substantially less to
the subcydical agitation, at its maxima and minima,
of the flow of materials into shoe factories than do
alterations in stocks of raw or in-process leather.138 CHAPTER11
TABLE 41
Amplitude of Fluctuation in Leather-Goods Manufacturers' Leather Consumption, Inventory
Investment, and Receipts during Each Subcycical Phase in Their Receipts or
Consumption, 1921—1940
(conforming, or nonconforming [—1,amplitudein thousands of hides)
1. REFERENCE FRAME: SUBCYCLES IN LEATHER CONSUMPTION
AMPLITUDE PER PHASE b
PHASE - Inventory
DURATION Investment
SUECYCLES IN. CONSUMPTION5 (months)Consumption Receipts c(3) —(2)
Peak Trough Peak (1) (2) (3) (4)
Jan.1923Aug. 1924 19 320 20 —300
Aug. 1924Oct. 1924 2 107 140 33
Oct. 1924Jan.1926 15 193 393 200
Jan.1926Dec. 1926 11 120 126 6
Dec. 1926Dec. 1928 24 433 442 9
Dec. 1928Nov. 1929 11 93 6 —87
Nov. 1929Nov. 1930 12 418 374 —44
Nov. 1930July 1931 8 212 379 167
July 1931Nov. 1931 4 242 420 178
Nov. 1931Mar.1932 4 93 132 39
Mar. 1982May 1982 2 188 167 —20
May 1932Nov. 1982 6 311 200 —111
Nov. 1932Mar. 1933 4 127 —24 —151
Mar. 1933June1933 3 365 666 301
June 1933Dec. 1983 6 143 540 397
Dec. 1933May 1934 5 144 251 107
May 1934Sept. 1934 4 177 141 —36
Sept. 1934Dec. 1935 15 456 214 —242
Dec. 1935May 1936 5 244 83 —161
May 1936Dec. 1936 7 423 497 74
Dec. 1936Dcc. 1937 12 761 856 95
Dec. 1937Sept.1938 9 479 538 59
Sept. 1938Apr.1939 7 53 191 138
Apr.1989Nov.1939 7 82 249 167
Nov. 1939Apr.1940 5 284 346 62
Aggregate for all twenty-five phases 207 8,468 7,348 880
Average amplitude per phase 259 294 85
2. REFERENCEFRAME: SUBCYCLES LEATHER RECEIPTS
AMPLITUDE PER PHASE b
PHASE Inventory
DURATION Investment
SUBCYCLES IN RECEIPTS (months)Receipts 'Consumptionc(2)—(3)
Peak Trough Peak (1) (2) (3) (4)
Nov. 1921Feb. 1922 3 380 —22 402
Feb. 1922July1922 5 712 212 500
July 1922Dec. 1922 5 159 —270 429
Dec. 1922May 1923 5 9 —33 42
May1923Sept. 1928 4 344 204 140
Sept. 1923Feb. 1924 5 281 —60 341
Feb. 1924June 1924 4 346 32 314
June 1924Nov. 1924 5 430 79 351
Nov. 1924May 1925 6 567 75 492
May 1925Oct. 1925 5 236 —115 351
Oct. 1925Jan.1926 3 77 7 70
Jan.1926Sept.1926 8 193 60 133
Sept. 1926Apr. 1927 7 131 17 114
Apr. 1927June 1927 2 173 —4 177
June 1927Sept. 1928 15 691 396 295
Sept. 1928June 1929 9 360 88 272
June 1929Nov. 1930 17 587 368 219
Nov. 1930July 1931 8 379 212 167
July 1931Oct.1931 3 374 236 138
(continued on next page)-- "!
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TABLE41 (continued)
REFERENCE FRAME: SURCYCLES IN LEATHER RECEIPTS (continued)
PHASE
AMPLITUDE PER PHASE b
Inventory
DURATION Investment








Oct.1931Feb. 1932 4 145 114 31
Feb. 1932May 1932 3 227 216 11
May 1932Sept. 1932 4 242 239 3
Sept. 1932Feb. 1933 5 145 52 93
Feb. 1933June 1933 4 792 361 431



















































Aggregate for all thirty-five phases







a Databegin in 1921. The first specffic trough or peak marked for receipts was the peak in
November 1921; for consumption, it was the peak in January 1923; see also Appendix A, sec. I.
b A series is said to conform to the reference- phase when it rises between the initial and
terminal reference dates of an expansion or falls during a contraction. Standings at reference
peaks and troughs are typically taken as centered three-month averages of monthly data (see
Appendix A, secs. 12 and 13).
A description of the series will be found in Appendix B: leather consumption (45); leather
receipts (89); and leather inventory investment (74). In each section of the table, the data
in column 2 are the specific subcycical amplitude of the series used as reference frame.
TABLE 42
Average Amplitude of Fluctuation in Leather-Goods Manufacturers' Leather Consumption,
Inventory Investment, and Receipts during Specified Types of Fluctuations in Their Receipts
Consumption, 1921—1940 a




















1.Number 5.5 11 25 15 10
2.Average duration, months 31.3 16.1 8.3 11.3 3.8
Net conforming amplitude, thou-
sands of hides: b
Consumption
3. Average per phase C 536 416 259 300 197
4. Average per month 14 22 32 26 52
Receipts
5. Average per phase C 649 449 294 335 282
6. Average per month 17 24 35 29 61
Inventory investment
7. Average per phase C 113 83 35 35 35
8. Average per month 3 2 4 3 9
9. Ratio to consumption d 0.21 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.18
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 42 (continued)





















1.Number 5.5. 11 35 15 20
2.Average duration, months 37.4 19.4 6.3 9.3 4.0
































Average per phase C
Averageper month













a All series are identical to those in Table 41.
b The peak and trough standings from which phase amplitudes are computed are centered
three-month averages.
c The measures for each phase are weighted by the number of months to which they apply.
d Net aggregate conforming amplitude for inventory investment divided by the same measure
for consumption.
This finding is similar to, though somewhat more
extreme than, the parallel one for shoe retailing,
Measured at turns in the earlier of the two flows that
bound the activity of each sort of firm, a large part
of the fluctuation in the flow of materials into the
plant takes the form of fluctuation in inventory invest-
ment rather than in outflow of finished goods. But for
shoe retailers, this same statement could be made when
fluctuations were measured at the time that the later
of the bounding activities, in this case retail sales,
reached peaks or troughs; for shoe manufacturing,
because of the lead of inventory investment, this was
notthe case.7
For shoe manufacturing, the contributions of con-
sumption and of change in stocks to fluctuation in
The close association of fluctuations in inventory investment
with leather receipts raises this question: Assume that leather
receipts were a very poor series, having many erratic and
economically meaningless fluctuations; assume that these same
fluctuations do not appear in the more reliable series on con-
sumption; they would then reappear in inventory investment
obtained by subtracting consumption from receipts.
To reduce the likelihood that this sort of thing lies behind the
conclusions as to the importance of inventory investment, the
relative contributions of consumption and inventory investment
to fluctuations in receipts were measured using the SLH-subcycle
reference frame. But the reference dates were shifted uniformly
to allow for the average timing characteristics of receipts. A
lead of either two months or one month was about equally char-
acteristic, so both were used. With the lead of two months, the
receipts of leather characteristically differ according
to length of phase. It will be recalled that analogous
distinctions were observed for retail trade. The second
half of Table 42 indicates that inventory investment
plays a less important part in cycles than in subcycles
in receipts of leather, less in all cycles than in only
those associated with the major tides in the industry.
But these differences may simply reflect characteristic
differences in phase duration, where a sharp line of
cleavage seems to lie: for phases of under six months'
duration, the relative importance of inventory invest-
ment is almost three times as great as for phases of over
six months.
These findings excite curiosity. Clearly, inventory
investment by shoe manufacturers plays an important
part in shaping the minor fluctuations in tanners'
shipments of leather. What sorts of objectives and cir-
aggregate amplitude of receipts, 1922—1940, was 8.9 million
hides, 4.0 million for inventory investment and 4.9 million for
consumption; thus investment amounted to 82 per cent of the
fluctuation in consumption. When the comparisons were made
adjusting the reference date to only one month earlier, the three
figures were, in millions, 9.5, 8.7, and 5.8, respectively, and in-
vestment now amounted to 64 per cent of the fluctuation in con-
sumption during reference subcycles. These calculations suggest
that, though some of the importance of inventory investment
in accounting for fluctuation in leather buying relative to shoe
selling may be a function of the way in which random elements
affect the calculation, the basic conclusion as to its importance
holds.cumstances cause the receipts of leather by shoe manu-
facturers to have the temporal association with fin-
ished production that produces this amplifying ef-
fect?
To answer this question it is necessary to examine,
as we did for shoe retailers, the way in which the size
of stocks is related to, and conditioned by, the selling,
production, and procurement problems of the busi-
ness. In the course of this examination, light may be
thrown on one aspect of a broader question. It would
be quite possible for the observed patterns of inven-
tory investment in raw and in in-process leather to
exist even though shoe manufacturers always covered
their leather requirements the moment they received
orders for shoes. The greater fluctuation in leather
receipts than in shoe production could then simply
reflect a closer association between leather orders and
receipts than between shoe orders and shoe produc-
tion. On the other hand, the patterns would likewise
be entirely compatible with orders for leather that had
greater subcydical amplitude than orders received
for shoes. In other words, the pattern of stock on order
may further amplify fluctuation in the backward trans-
mission of demand imposed by the pattern of stock
on hand. It will be worthwhile to keep this question
in mind—though, to anticipate, there is little that we
can do to answer it—while studying how and why in-
ventory investment follows the course that it does.
How the Volume of Production and
Buying Is Determined
First, to what extent are production schedules and
buying linked to expected sales? In a retail shoe store
we could almost take for granted that merchants aimed
to buy precisely those shoes, and in just the quantity,
that customers would purchase promptly at a profita-
ble price; inventory aims were colored by this main
purpose. In a manufacturing concern we cannot take
this firm intended association between selling and
buying for granted, but must inquire specifically
whether it is present. For without the central inten-
tion of buying what will in short order be sold, it is
an anomaly to speak of a sharp and central"aim" with
respect to the physical size of inventories at all. As
the broad outlines of buying procedures are described,
it is well to keep in mind other questions, the answers
to which contribute to the specification of the accelera-
tion mechanisms that may be at work. Insofar as
buying is based on sales, are expected or actual sales
critical? Is there a cascaded pattern to buying for
output of a given month? Is the price of the finished




Periodic planning of the amount, style, culor, and
price of shoes to be produced during the ensuing
months (very typically six months) is common among
shoe manufacturers. The sales forecasts on the basis
of which plans are laid are prepared with great care.
Ordinarily, plans for the fallline are fonnulated
around April or May, and for the spring line around
October. In planning a line, a great deal is taken for
granted and typically not, subjected to review each
season—the general sort of shoe to be manufactured,
the type of customer to whom it is meant to appeal,
the price line at which it will be expected to retail,
the marketing channels to be used, the process of
manufacture, the capacity of the factory, and even
detailed cost figures for many of the pieces or opera-
tions involved in the manufacture of the various
classes of products. Moreover, many individual models,
at least for manufacturers of staple shoes, will be car-
ried over from the previous year. But more typically,
styles will change from season to season, though
change itself may follow a discernible trend. For
women's high-style shoes, many new models will be
introduced not only at the planning period, but fre-
quently during the season.
The sales forecasts will be made for each line of
shoes—that is, for each group of models falling intG
some broader category such as a given retail price line,
technique of manufacture, or use designation. For a
large company, the forecasts may be built by recon-
ciling the summed estimates of individual salesmen
and district managers with estimates made by the
heads of the company or various branches of the com-
pany. In a small company, the guess as to future sales.
may be done scientifically or by ear. Generally, the
core of the estimating process is the record of last
year's sales or of sales for the past several years. This
figure is then modified by adding the amount that the
business may be "going ahead," and by judgments.
on the condition of retailers' stocks and on general
business conditions in the coming season. The prog-.
nosis of the business climate will affect not only the
estimate of total sales but also its composition. If,
for example, the forecast of economic weather is
gloomy, lower price lines may be emphasized; Or shoes
made for stock may gain in importance relative to
those made to order.
The sales forecasts are often used as the basis for
financing plans, marketing plans, personnel plans,
or for the integration of various branches of the busi-
ness. They may also become the basis of leather buy-.
ing. But as far as I can determine, they do not typi-.




The reason for this is clear enough: the specificity
of the product is too great to permit extensive manu-
facture of anything except the particular style, color,
material, size, and width of shoe that someone has
ordered. Shoe manufacturers testify to this, claiming
that most shoes in this country are made to order.
Of course some anticipation of peak requirements
takes place; also, an in-stock department is carried
by many manufacturers. But even in in-stock depart-
ments, though a particular shoe is not manufactured
in response to a particular order, information conveyed
by the incoming order on what shoes are being bought
and in what quantities is closely audited before shoes
are ticketed for production.
The notion of a tight link between sales and produc-
tion seems to be supported by scraps of statistical
data. Such information as we have on the volume
of orders, largely wholesale sales, seems to bear a
close correspondence with the volume of shoe output
month by month (see Table 32, above); and the fact
that wholesale sales lead, especially at peaks, suggests
that output responds to orders rather than vice versa.
Stocks of finished shoes carried by shoe manufac-
turers appear to be small relative to production. This
perhaps suggests that the reservoir from which to
supply a rate of shipments that diverged materially
from that of production is small, and consequently
serious divergence is debarred. Judging from reported
end-of-year inventories, shoe producers had enough
shoes in stock to cover about three weeks' sales in
1937, two weeks' sales in 1939, and one week's sales
in 1947.8Thoughthese figures are low for the year as
a whole, they indicate that stocks are too small to
facilitate any considerable divergence between produc-
tion and shipments.° To illustrate, on the basis of the
census figures: If production had been only 10 per
cent less than shipments for three months in a row
in 1939, stocks would have been reduced to about
two-fifths of their average value.
Seasonal patterns, too, should be capable of inform-
ing on the association of orders and production, but
unfortunately neither of the stand-ins for subcyclical
8Theratio of the value of output for the year to an average
of the value of beginning- and end-of-year inventories of finished
goods held by shoe manufacturers was reported to the Census
ofManufactures (1987, Part II, Table 2, P. 123; 1939, Vol. I,
Chap. VIII, Table [1], p. 857; 1947, Vol. I, Chap. V, Table
[1], p. 154 and Vol. II, Table 5, p. 480) as 15.5 in 1937, 25.4
in 1939, and 48.2 in 1947.
Year-end inventories are typically lower than those for the
year as a whole. Also there is serious question as to how good the
census information on inventories for shoe factories is. Particularly
when manufacturers produce largely to order, it seems likely that
they may answer that they carry no inventories of finished goods
even though they hold some inventories, most of which, inci-
dentally, may be sold.
or cyclical timing patterns of shoe orders (wholesale
sales and shoe and leather orders) would speak relia-
bly about seasonal patterns. However, the association
of seasonal patterns of retail sales with those of shoe
production is not entirely without relevance. The
months of peak or trough activity in production tend
to precede those in sales by two months.'° Were the
seasonal patterns of production simply a product of
the effort of shoe manufacturers to operate efficiently
in spite of the strongly seasonal character of consumer
takings, there would be no reason for production to
fall off until a few weeks before seasonal peaks in sales.
That it does suggests that production schedules re-
spond to actual orders from retailers or wholesalers,
which are heaviest several months before retail sales
reach peaks.
The conclusion emerges that production in shoe fac-
tories is undertaken primarily in direct or indirect
response to specffic orders, though, of course, there
is a penumbra of seasonal anticipation of demand, or
of work undertaken on the basis of advices less bind-
ing to the customer than a confirmed order (not that
the bond of a confirmed order is always inviolate).
BUYING PROCEDURES
How buying by shoe manufacturers will relate to
orders for shoes must• depend also on objectives about
in-process or raw materials stocks. In order to deter-
mine what they are, or indeed in what sense the term
objective applies, it is necessary to learn how leather
buying is governed. The problem of procuring leather
for manufacture into shoes has a double focus: first,
leather should be on hand at the time when shoes
ought to be cut because of the limitations set by prom-
ised delivery schedules and efficient production plan-
ning; second, it should be bought at the right price.
Shoe manufacturers purchase leather in a market in
which suppliers (primarily tanners) carry large stocks
of finished leather; in the interwar period they aver-
aged almost a three months' supply. Small lots of
leather can often be obtained within a day or so, plus
time in transit. When markets are weak, very sub-
10Seasonalindexes for retail sales (an average of those of
chain and department store shoe sales) and for shoe production
for 1926 to 1940 are:
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June
688497113114122
92991121049794
July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Retail sales 7875113104100151
Shoe production 981181121108580
The rank correlation of seasonal indexes of production, allow-
ing for the two-month lead of production compared with sales,
is +.78. With a one-month lead, it is +29, and synchronous
timing yields a rank correlation of —.30.
Retail sales
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stantial lots may be obtained in the same way. Tanners
require advance warning for large lots in a strong
market, especially for upper leather, which is made
in a wide variety of qualities, colors, and finishes. But
the need of the large leather buyer to reserve tanning
facilities can be covered by a blanket order that does
not require inconveniently long advance knowledge
of just what shoes will be bought and, consequently,
what leathers will be required. The speed with which
leather can be obtained is testified to by the fact that
a thirty-day supply seems commonly to be considered
adequate for the efficient mechanical operation of
a shoe factory. This means that a substantial propor-
tion of leather can actually be on hand in time to
meet production schedules if it is purchased some-
where between two to six weeks ahead of the day when
work on shoe orders is scheduled to start. For the in-
dustry as a whole, leather stocks have equaled as little
as one and a quarter months of leather consumption
when output was high.
But if,as has been indicated, shoe distributors
typically place a substantial portion of their orders
several months before the shoes are required to be de-
livered, a large proportion of leather can be ordered
after shoes have actually been sold. Consequently, the
shoe manufacturer, unlike the retailer, does not have
to buy mainly on the basis of guesses about future
sales. Were it not for the matter of price expectations,
he could buy at least a very large proportion of his re-
quirements on the basis of actual, as contrasted with
expected, sales.h1 This possibility appeared in the lead
of wholesale sales relative to shoe production turn by
turn (see Table 32, above). If we assume that turns
in orders are dated by turns in wholesale sales, then
at peaks in production, when it may be necessary to
buy leather four to six weeks before it has to enter pro-
duction, turns in orders occur earlier than those of shoe
production in 85 per cent of the turns. At troughs,
when leather can often be obtained well within the
month, troughs in orders occur earlier than, or in the
same month as, troughs in production in 85 per cent of
the turns (they are synchronous in 46 and lead in 39
per cent of the cases). Allowing for a lead of two
months at peaks and none at troughs, wholesale sales
are in opposite phase to shoe production in only 23
per cent of the months. Thus at both peaks and
troughs, the figures suggest that leather can usually be
bought after the orders for shoes have been written yet
be on hand, if not when the production run first
had to get under way, at least so shortly thereafter
11Thereis, of course, a guess involved as to whether orders
will be firm, especially at certain times, but at worst only a
portion of total sales is likely to be involved.
that raw material stocks can easily bridge the gap.
Insofar as a shoe manufacturer links his buying to
his customers' buying—buying earlier when tetailers
have bought earlier and at the last minute when they
have—leather buying will have the same cascaded pat-
terns as shoe buying: orders of varying term will con-
verge on delivery requirements of a given month.
However, this pattern will be modified by the desire
to smooth seasonal fluctuations in production by taking
advantage of early orders to produce before the sea-
sonal peaks.
The fact that leather can be bought after sales are
known is important in connection with the problems
in which we are interested, but equally important is
the fact that, for several sorts of leather, there is little
reason why it should be. Sole leather and standard
sorts of brown, black, and white upper leather are
staples that can always be used and for which carry-
ing charges are not high, so that if there are good rea-
sons not to gear the buying of these leathers tightly to
current sales, the associated inventory costs are not a
serious deterrent. Even for upper leather, the possi-
bility of placing a blanket order without specifying
types and finishes means that ownership position can
vary considerably from current requirements for pro-
duction schedules. Economies or other advantages are
often thought to result from anticipating requirements,
and anticipation at some times implies retrenchment
at others.
Extension of the ownership position in leather can
take several forms: 12(1)Spot purchases may be in-
creased when markets are expected to tighten; con-
versely, when they are expected to fail, buying may
be held up as long as stocks permit. (2) More long-
term orders may be placed. Typically, the advance
leather purchases will be slated for delivery at several
stated times during the season. Each of the lots may
be bought at the same or at different prices; in either
case, however, the price would usually have been de-
cided at the time the order was placed. (3) Cotitracts
for the purchase of leather may be placed without
specifying the exact product to be delivered. Whether
the futures market in hides is also used as a method
of hedging against or taking a bet on leather prices,
12use the term ddownership position" to apply to unptocessed
and semiprocessed leather but not to finished shoes. It ought
perhaps mean all materials—whether raw, in process, or finished
—that are either on hand or on order, minus outstanding orders
of customers. As far as I can judge, the term ownership position
seems to be used in the more limited sense in the shoe industry
(though not in the tanning industry)—it applies here to leather,
not finished shoes, and allowances are not made for cu$tomers'
orders outstanding; in any event, that is how I use it unless other-
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I cannot say; reports conflict. My impression is that the
part it plays is probably small."
This description of how leather is bought carries irn-
plications concerning the character of the two acceler-
ating mechanisms—the one linked to stock objectives
and the other to changing market prospects. Both need
to be examined in the environment of shoe factories.
Stocks under Stable Market Prospects
Were market prospects stable, interest would focus
on the amount of leather that ought to be in the fac-
tory; the amount on order would be a simple function
of this amount, changing perhaps proportionately, and
may be disregarded in considering causes of change.
Our point of departure is the fact that a large portion
of needed leather can be bought after orders for shoes
have actually been received. Two interesting results
follow.
First, were this true of all leather and in all cases,
inventories of unprocessed leather on hand and even
on order could be very small indeed. They would have
to consist only of a supply to bridge the period re-
quired to buy, receive, and sort leather, plus a safety
margin. Insofar as there is always some portion of shoe
output for which orders are not on hand in time to buy
leather explicitly for those shoes, a further margin is
required. Under stable market prospects, then, stocks
of leather will bear a positive relationship to the vol-
ume of production. The character of the relation will
depend on storage costs, on the convenience of a par-
ticular frequency and size of leather orders, on the re-
quirements of sorting and marking leather, and on a
safety factor that may be large or small depending on
the extent of the unknown element in sales and in de-
liveries. Secondly, whether or not the resulting in-
tended size of leather stocks is properly thought of as
an objective or simply as the consequence of objectives
focusing elsewhere, it is not one that must be enforced
primarily through the progressive correction of un-
avoidable error, since a substantial portion of leather
buying can be based on actual rather than anticipated
sales. When sales are known, inventory objectives can
be roughly validated directly rather than through cor-
rection of error. There need be no error.
Presumably, then, under stable market prospects,
the size of stocks of unprocessed leather would be di-
rectly associated with the volume of production, but
the relation would be a loose one. Since extra receipts
must precede extra production, leather inventories
"The Hide Exchange was founded in 1929 and trading in
it did not reach sizable proportions until about 1935. At most,
it could have played a part only in the last five years that our
figures cover.
would probably reach peaks and troughs a bit before
shoe production. It is possible, though not at all clear,
that the association between stocks on hand and on
order and orders for shoes would be closer than be-
tween these stocks and shoe production. For stock in
process one would expect a positive, though not a
rigid, association between output and stocks: a three
weeks' supply may be a fairly typical figure.'4 With so
short a period of production, one would hardly expect
the theoretically indicated lead of change in in-process
stock over change in finished output to be visible in
monthly statistics. For raw and in-process leather to-
gether, the aggregate to which the major time series
refer, we would expect (under stable market condi-
tions) stocks to be small—perhaps averaging no more
than six weeks' supply; this is about the minimum
ratio shown in the figures prior to 1938, when the data
seem to undergo some curious aberration. A change in
shoe sales or production would be expected to involve
a synchronous or a prior change in manufacturers'
stocks on hand and on order, though not a large one—
perhaps one of about equal size; the incremental
output-stock ratio (relating preparations for begin-
ning-of-month stocks to changes in output between the
previous month and the current month) might be
around one.
Unsold finished stocks of shoes appear to be small
and in all probability to respond inversely to at least
the short-lived fluctuations in consumer demand. This
is suggested by the character of the problem manufac-
turers face, evidence for finished stocks of other sorts,
and a little information on shoe stocks of shoe manu-
facturers. Beginning in 1946, information on stocks,
output, and shipment for a sample of shoe manufac-
turers is available." Production dropped strongly be-
tween the second quarters of 1946 and 1947—from
48.3 to 36.9 million pairs per month; contemporane-
ously, stocks rose from 6.7 to 12.0 million pairs, or from
a seventh to a third of monthly output. Production rose
very gradually for the next four years to 40.5 in 1950,
the spring when the Korean war began. Stocks stayed
about level until the scare of shortages sent them
ing to 15.9 million pairs, or two-fifths of a month's out-
put. In the next year the inverse pattern reappeared as
production fell to 38.1 million pairs per month in the
second quarter of 1951 and stocks rose to 19.3, or one-
half a month's output. In any event, stocks of finished
shoes in manufacturers' plants are very small and un-
'4A two-week period in actual production is common, and
waits between departments are likely to occur.
Monthly statistics are given for shipments and production
for identical firms in the Facts for Industry series on the produc-
lion of shoes and slippers of the Bureau of the Census, so that
change in finished shoe stocks may be computed. The data are
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sold stocks probably smaller still, and we do not refer
to them again.
Changing Market Prospects
In the constellation of reasons that stimulate or dis-
courage shoe manufacturers' forward buying, expected
price plays a more important part than it does for the
retailer. Consequently, a model for the impact of price
expectations may be made more precise than is pos-
sible in connection with the more nebulous associated
considerations such as protection of delivery dates and
qualities, so important in retailers' buying. Further,
since the havoc that unintended change in stocks
under stable market prospects plays with an empirical
study of stocks is at a minimum for leather inventories,
and since our data on stocks are at least better than
our data on shoes, a well-founded hypothesis may be
subjected to a tentative empirical test.
MOTIVES INFLUENCING SHIVrS IN MABKET POSITION
A variety of motives, individually or together, may
counsel either an extension or a contraction of the shoe
manufacturers' position in leather.
Shoe manufacturers do not take the risk in buying
staple leathers that a shoe distributor does in buying
the highly specified product, shoes. Both physically
and stylewise, sole leather and various standard sorts
of brown, black, and white upper leather are durable
products. They are sufficiently undifferentiated so that
they can be used in the manufacture of a wide variety
of specific shoes. Further, leather is not exceptionally
bulky or expensive to store. In consequence, buying
predicated on a guess about the future course of prices
hazards only the difference between the price paid
and what might have been paid had prices been cor-
rectly forecast (assuming no correlated changes had
occurred). It is not accompanied, as in a retail shoe
store, by the serious danger that error in estimating
the amount of customers' requirements in the near
future will involve costly markdowns, physical loss,
or high carrying charges. The absence of reasons not to
consider market prospects in leather buying opens the
door to positive motives.
Positive reasons for altering ownership positions are
similar to those encountered in retailing, though their
relative importance differs. When business is brisk,
stocks of finished leather at tanneries diminish; also, as
production nears capacity, hides required to fill new
orders for leather are likely to suffer delay in reaching
the soaking vats as well as the finishing sheds. In either
case, the ability of customers to obtain desired grades
of leather at short notice must diminish compared with
times when demand is slack, finished stocks high, and
output low. Consequently, the fear of impaired selec-
tions or late deliveries is likely to cause a shoe manu-
facturer, like a shoe retailer, to order a larger propor-
tion of expected requirements further ahead when
markets are expected to be tight than when they are
expected to be slack. The somewhat better bargaining
position of the seller relative to the buyer at such times
may tend in the same direction since sellers prefer ad-
vance notice. Finally, the successful operation of a
shoe factory requires that leather be bought at the
right price; the effort to do so induces early buying in
an advancing market where selling prices are rela-
tively inflexible and operating margins are threatened
by soaring buying prices.
Action to achieve simultaneously sure delivery, de-
sired quality, and right price often takes the of a
contract with a tanner to deliver an order in several
lots over a sequence of months. The price at which
such a contract is written may reflect economies for
the tanner. These economies may increase in a good
market as advance contracts for leather permir early
buying of hides (without attendant risk) since their
price is likely to rise more than leather price. If so, it
is possible that some of the advantages, if passed on
to the leather buyer, induce additional advance order-
ing. But whether or not this is the case, there are many
other reasons why the buyer will choose to increase his
advance-order ratio when markets tighten—the fear
of poorer selections and delayed delivery; the convic-
tion that though he is paying more for sequential de-
liveries than the spot price at the time of making the
contract, he is paying less than he would have to pay
if he waited until nearer the required delivery date.
When extension of ownership position is achieved
through purchases for immediate delivery, all three
motives (better selection, secure delivery, and advan-
tageous price) are again likely to exert pressure in the
same direction and at the same time.
In short, whatever form shifts in market position
may take—whether that of advance contract or of spot
buying—motivation will include each of the price,
delivery, choice aspects. This is likely to be true for
an individual, but it is certainly true for the market as
a whole, composed of many different individuals some
of whom like to think in terms of price and others only
in terms of operating efficiency. However, it seeffis in-
evitable that, of the three motives, expected price,
either directly or via its effect on margins, must be far
more important in leather than in shoe buying.
But just as the immediate motive can be any or all
of the three sorts of considerations, the next level of
judgments is likewise interwoven and interchangeable.
Judgments about price, delivery periods, and selec-
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the strength of demand, prices of materials, and per-
haps operating margins. Thus, the expectation that
delivery periods are likely to lengthen or choices be-
come poorer iscertainly inspired by a high, and
rapidly increasing, level of customer demand. An in-
crease in customer demand may mean an increase in
undelivered orders, a bullish sign. But since shoe
manufacturers know that part of the pressure on the
resources of their suppliers is due to speculative buy-
ing, price expectations must also dictate the antici-
pated physical delays. Conversely, unless customer de-
mand is expected to be strong, prices are not likely to
rise. The role that margins play is more subtle but also
interwoven with the other two.
At a deeper level still, judgments about prices (or
margins), deliveries, selections, and customer demand
also depend on a broad fabric of information and ex-
periences that come to the businessman from every
corner of his domain during every hour of the day—
the level and composition of his sales, orders, stocks,
and costs; the way salesmen talk and act; how many
telephone calls he receives from would-be sellers (or
buyers if he is a seller); how rapidly proposed prices
are accepted by the other party to a trade; what sort of
delivery terms are being considered; gossip about large
receipts or purchases or sales made in some quarters.
Individual experience can be multiplied by discus-
sion with others—competitors, resources, customers,
bankers, or advisors of various sorts. Many of the large
integrated companies get a great deal of information
from other branches of their own business, at the same
time that other people in the trade keep spyglasses
trained on their doings. Finally, statistics for the
dustry are watched; general economic phenomena
may be considered—other open-market prices, broad
economic conditions, the temper of the labor market,
to mention a few. It is useful to bear in mind how
intricate is the perceptive apparatus that governs ex-
pectations. It indicates that in part, expectations sup-
port themselves both by influencing the expectations
of others and, when they result in appropriate actions,
by forming a basis for further expectation of the same
sort. But for the moment we can deal with these mat-
ters at a more superficial level as we endeavor to de-
scribe the pattern through time of the major factors
bearing on changes in ownership position caused by
changing market prospects.
For this purpose, expected price, deliveries, and se-
lections can be treated as one since they move together
—we call them price. But it is necessary to distinguish
between the actual level of expected price and the risk
and uncertainty dimensions of the guess. Expected
sales likewise need to be separately considered as does
also that aspect of price expectations that focuses on
operating margins.
EXPECTEDSALES
In an industry where supply is not subject to strong
independent alteration, the level of actual prices and
of expected prices are likely to be associated with the
level of demand and perhaps its rate of change. Con-
sequently expectations about sales will bear on inven-
tory investment through their influence on expecta-
tions about prices. In addition, when sales are high
and increasing rapidly, stringencies are more likely to
develop in the supply of leather than when they are
low and falling rapidly. Consequently lengthening de-
livery periods and reduced selections have a positive
association with optimistic evaluations of customer de-
mand. Of course, these evaluations are not single-
valued but are probability distributions for which both
the character of the distribution and the level of un-
certainty are relevant to their effect on buying.
The effect on buying of a given distribution of ex-
pectations held with a given certainty will also depend
on the seasonal pattern of sales. Compare two indus-
tries: for one the seasonal index of buying for January
through June is 100foreach month; for the other the
index for each month in sequence is 70, 70, 130, 140,
100, 90. In both cases sales are expected to rise by 10
per cent. In the first industry, a factory will be busier
by 10 points each month. In the second, it will be
busier by 10 per cent of 140 or 14 points in the busiest
and 7 points in the least busy months. If the supplier
isnot willing to anticipate requirements in slack
months, there will be more trouble getting goods in
April in the second case than the first. For if sales are
expected to increase for the season, each month's sales
will typically be expected to rise by about the same
percentage amount. But the difficulty in getting Sup-
plies is a function of the absolute increase or decrease
in work on factory floors. Consequently, the absolute
maximum monthly impact of the resulting stringency
will be larger, other things the same, for the industry
with strong seasonal peaks, like shoe production, than
for an industry where output is subject to less seasonal
variation.
If, as these reflections indicate, the level of sales and
perhaps its rate of change influence expected prices
and delivery conditions both directly and through an
impact on actual prices and actual delivery conditions,
it is not likely that prices will be expected to rise unless
sales are rising, or to fall unless sales are falling. Ap-
propriate behavior of sales thus becomes a necessary
though not a sufficient condition to changes in market-
prospect-tied buying. The link is important, for itMANUFACTURERS' BUYING—i 147
means that the two accelerating mechanisms often re-
inforce and seldom oppose one another.
IMPACT OF EXPECTED PRICES ON LEATHER BUYING
The Expected Change in Prices. Consider how the
leather buying of shoe manufacturers might behave if
businessmen knew both future production schedules
and prices, and were entirely sure and willing to act;
that is, assume risk and uncertainty 11 to be nonexist-
on the average, about 11 percentage points rind as
much as 22 points in one case. The corresponding
figures for possible advance shoe purchases of shoe
retailers and wholesalers were about 4 and 6 percent-
age points respectively for the average figures, and
9.5 and 13.5 for the extreme ones. In addition, the
number of opportunities for speculative gain were
more frequent for shoe manufacturers than for shoe
distributors. Needless to say, the table glimpses no
TABLE 43
Opportunities to Increase Shoe Manufacturers' Margins by Correctly Anticipating Rise in Wholesale Price of Leather by as Long as
Six Months, 1922—1941
(prices in centsperpair of shoes)
ent. For convenience, assume further that there is no
cost to carrying leather stocks. (Indeed, since we ad-
dress ourselves to orders for, rather than receipts of,
leather, there need be no explicit cost to the buyer.)
Assume, finally, an arbitrary limit of six months to the
period for which leather will be bought ahead. These
are precisely the assumptions that underlay the cor-
responding calculations for shoe buying of retailers
and wholesalers (Tables 36 and 37 in Chapter 9)
Theresults appear in Table 43. Apparently shoe
manufacturers might have increased their margins by,
16make the usual distinction between the two: risk involves
chances of an actuarial sort; uncertainty involves exposure to
surprise.
17 There is less justification in connection with leather buying
for the assumption that risk, uncertainty, and carrying cost are
zero prior to six months and intolerable thereafter. But there is
some reality to the notion of absolute limits; and the contrast
between the possibility of gain to the leather buyer and the
possibility to the shoe buyer, under identical assumptions, is
instructive.
more than a foolish dream of the reward to be won by
successful speculation, since any number of the as-
sumptions underlying its construction are thoroughly
unrealistic. However, the dream appears to be a bright
one and, in consequence, likely to be pursued. It sug-
gests that since the potential reward is high, the effort
to buy leather at the right price is extremely likely to
be an important part of management objectives in a
shoe factory.
It illustrates a second point easily The
gross advantage to be gained from advance buying
depends not on the level of leather prices, but on their
rate of change. Ignoring risk and uncertainty, the ex-
pected advantage depends, ceteris paribus, the
expected rate of change in prices. Then the arirsount
actually bought ahead would depend, of course, on
carrying charges and the costs of buying and receiving
orders of various sizes, factors ruled out of the ex-
ample.
MARGIN FOR
CURRENT MONTHWHEN BEST ADVANCESELLING PRICE GROSS MARGIN ON SHOES PURCHASED
WREN SALE IS PURCHASE MIGHTAS REPORTED FOR LEATHER SHOES IN ADVANCE
TO BE MADE HAVE BEEN MADE CATFLE-HIDE ON DATh OF SALE AS Cents
Leather LeatherLEATHERSHOES OF SELLING PRICE perPair%of Selling Price over Margin
Date Price a Date Price aONDATEOFSALEb [(5) —(2)]± (5) x100(5) —(4) (7) ± (5) x100(8) —(6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8) (7) (8) (9)
Oct. 1922108.6May 192291.2 178.9 39.3 87.7 49.0 9.7
Jan. 1925112.5July 192492.3 180.6 37.7 88.3 48.9 11.2
Oct. 1927131.0Apr. 192792.6 194.9 32.8 102.3 52.5 10.7
Oct. 1929110.7June 1929101.5 182.5 39.3 81.0 44.4 5.1
Aug. 193183.0Feb. 193175.6 154.9 46.4 79.3 51.2 4.8
Oct. 193262.5June 193256.1 130.7 52.2 74.6 57.1 4.9
Aug. 193385.1Feb. 193352.0 152.6 44.2 100.6 65.9 21.7
May 193572.6Nov. 193459.8 153.0 52.5 93.2 60.9 6.4
Feb. 193787.5Aug. 193665.6 164.4 46.8 98.8 60.1 13.3
Nov. 193879.9Aug. 193867.3 161.2 50.4 93.9 58.3 7.9
Oct. 193992.7May 193967.8 178.8 47.6 109.0 61.7 14.1
Jan. 194192.3Aug. 194074.2 175.8 47.5 101.8 57.8 10.3
Average 10.9
a Current (LIFO) leather cost per cattle-hide shoe (series hide leathers as reported to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (series
20 in Appendix B). 4).
b The average price of shoes that appear to be made of cattle-148 CHAPTER 11
Consider now how the picture is altered by the in-
clusion, in as realistic a fashion as possible, of first
risk and then uncertainty.18
Risk. It is clear that a shoe manufacturer believes
that risk attaches to increasing his advance position,
and that the extent of the risk is a function not only of
his evaluation of market conditions, but also of factors
involving his own firm. For one thing, there is more
risk in buying six months ahead than in buying two
months ahead—in carrying a six-month supply on
hand and on order than in carrying a two-month sup-
ply. To justify the larger investment, prices will have
to be higher than the current ones for six rather than
two months; the speculation will endanger a larger.
proportion of the resources of the company, especially
the liquid resources; the speculation will require that
a larger supply of funds be available, and if the funds
must be obtained from a bank, a large loan may be
more difficult to liquidate than a small one, whereas
failure to liquidate at the proper time is a black mark
on a credit Risk also differs sharply for various
sorts of leather. It is less for staples (sole leather and
brown, black, and white upper leather) than for side
upper leathers of a less standard sort. The average
week's supply of leather stock as a whole will thus be
a weighted composite of very different supplies of each
of the sorts of leather on hand.
Increasing risk attached to extending the forward
position or substituting risky for 'less risky leathers
means that inducements must increase to warrant
further market extension. Carrying, ordering, and de-
livery costs are no longer the limiting factor, given the
rate of change in prices. As the output-stock ratio (or
perhaps the absolute amount of stock) increases, a
higher rate of return—that is, a greater rate of increase
in prices—is required to justify further extension of
a given amount.
But it seems likely that the influence of risk on the
association between the size of the advance position
and the expected rate of change in prices is essentially
discontinuous. We have already learned that shoe re-
J have found helpful ideas in the following discussions:
C. L. S. Shackle, Expectation in Economics, Cambridge, 1949;
E. S. Shaw, "Elements of a Theory of Inventory," Journal of
Political Economy, August 1940, pp. 465—485; Nicholas Kalder,
"Speculation and Economic Stability," Reniew of Economic
Studies, October 1939, Pp. 1—27; A. C. Hart, "Anticipations,
Uncertainty, and Dynamic Planning," Studies in Business Ad-
ministration, Vol. XI, no. 1, University of Chicago Press, 1940;
and Kenneth J. Arrow, "Alternative Approaches to the Theory
of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations," Econometrica, October
1951.
19 Inventory loans are typically expected to be liquidated at
certain times of the year—after enough time has elapsed for the
seasonal peak in production to be followed by a strong inflow
of cash from customers (see Morton Jennings, Jr., Bank Loans
of Shoe Manufacturers, Rwnpf, 1948, p. 200).
tailers do not seem to extend their position past the
season's requirements except under most unusual con-
ditions. Shoe manufacturers may restrict their com-
mitments for all but the most staple sorts of upper
leather in somewhat the same manner. In any event,
the advantage probably must increase a great deal
more than proportionally to justify a position greater
than a specific number of months' supply even in
staples. The appropriate number of weeks' supply may
be subject to alteration under extreme conditions of
one sort or another, but, by and large, there are gen-
erally accepted limits to permissible market extension
within an industry. Thus risk not only increases with
the length of the advance position; it tends to reach a
point where it virtually prohibits further extension.
This asymptotic character of what we shall call the
long-short market range has important consequences,
,for it tends to set limits to swings in buying associated
with changing market prospects. But in spite of their
considerable theoretical and practical importance,
little is known about the character of the limits. I set
down a few impressions which are badly in need of
testing and elaboration. On the short side, the limits
are set by factors of the sort discussed earlier under
stable market buying. On' the long side, seasonal pat-
terns both in customers' buying and in the suppiy of
raw materials play a part, and the physical durability
of the material may also have some bearing on the
point. However, any or all of these factors are reflected
in trade customs, and it is these mores that seem to be
the immediate determinants of the upper limits. They
seem to be enforced not only by a manufacturer's own
judgments on sound policy, but also by his suppliers'
and bankers' judgments. The limits may shift with the
years—my impression is that there has been a reduc-
tion since the early twenties in the width of the range.
They differ for different sàrts of leathers and, partly in
consequence, for different sorts of manufacturers. But
without being able to specify the criteria at work, the
important point is that these upper and lower bands do
seem to exist. Beyond them, the risk in extending or
contracting the market position increases at an ex-
tremely rapid rate.
How does the confidence with which a
given expectation is held affect the course of buying?
Uncertainty has already entered the picture in connec-
tion with the differential risk involved in holding vari-
ous sorts of leathers. High-style leathers are riskier in-
vestments than staples because demand for the former
can never be assessed with the certainty possible for
the latter. But uncertainty of this sort, which involves
a prediction of sales rather than prices, will vary pri-
marily among leathers rather than from one time to
another. Not so uncertainty about price.MANUFACTURERS' BUYING—i 149
Since a man's conception about future prices in-
volves uncertainty, it must also involve probability, in-
cluding some sort of probability distribution. If he
speaks of the expected price, he means no more than
the most probable of the many prices that he thinks
may prevail at the selected dates. Two situations with
the same most probable price may differ with respect
to the absolute probability assigned to the central and
to all of the expected prices; they may differ likewise
with respect to the dispersion of the other guesses
around their central value. It seems inevitable that the
higher the absolute probability assigned to each price
and the more concentrated their array, the more likely
a man will be to act in a situation involving risk on
the basis of a given central expectation about the
amount by which prices will change.
My impression is that shifts in a firm's advance buy-
ing are highly sensitive to alterations in the confidence
with which an opinion about price is held. On the
other hand, it seems likely that confidence has a tem-
poral pattern both for any individual entrepreneur and
for the market as a whole. It is likely to grow with the
length of time for which expectations of change in a
given direction are entertained. Also, like many social
phenomena, confidence is likely to be contagious, as
more and more customers, competitors, and suppliers
come to hold a given opinion. Assuming for the sake
of argument that the course by which a single indi-
vidual achieves full confidence follows an additive
path as optimistic omens cumulate, the market as a
whole may well gather momentum according to a geo-
metric rather than arithmetic principle. In both cases,
however, the process is cumulative and likely to paral-
lel more nearly the level of prices than their rate of
change.
Margins
The influence of margins on inventory investment
could take several forms. We have already suggested
that the size of current margins and their cumulation
in the form of liquid assets may influence the risk in-
volved in a given extension of the advance position,
under given expectations about sales and prices, under
otherwise stipulated conditions of risk and uncertainty.
But it is also possible that the size and recent history
of margins will of influence expectations
about prices and demand, so that the ceteris paribus
condition may not properly be imposed. The whole
matter is of considerable interest in view of its poten-
tial importance to the process of business fluctuation.
The shoe manufacturing industry is one to which the
classic characteristics of competitive enterprise are cer-
tainly not foreign. We learned in Chapter 2 that the in-
dustry has a large number of relatively small firms that
compete among one another for customers and ma-
terials. But there are also some firms doing so large
a proportion of the total business that they must ex-
plicitly consider the consequences of their actions on
the industry at large. Moreover, each line of shoes has
a smattering of the characteristics of a monopoly prod-
uct, since comparisons among shoes by prospective
customers are at best imperfect. Thus shoe prices have
some characteristics of competitive, some of conven-
tional, and some of managed, prices.20 How the several
strands intertwine is a complicated story that neither
needs to nor can be told here.
RIGIDITYOFSHOE PRICES
One aspect of it, however, is material to the margin
problem—the attitude of distributors. For they have
been in a position in the interwar period to exert strong
pressure on manufacturers' pricing policies. Retailers
plan their stocks in terms of price lines or bands.21 In
general, retailers seem loath to alter their prices. Mark-
downs and markups are used to only a limited extent
to bring actual stock in conformity with planned stock;
the major expedient is adjustment of But
more important in the present context, retailers resist
changes in manufacturers' prices on new lines of mer-
chandise.
Overt prices increase is perhaps the type of price
change that is most stoutly resisted. When the pres-
sure of increased costs on manufacturing grows too
strong, changes in the quality of the shoe are, at least
for a while, more likely to be accepted by the retailer
than is an explicit price change that would necessitate
departure from the customary price lines.28 However,
fear of alienating customers by price increases is less
severe if merchants judge that the market is supported
by strong consumer buying power. Retailers attempt
to judge whether such support is present, by a nervous
20 E. S. Shaw (op. cit.) has made a very interesting analysis
of how these several price structures bear on decisions alfecting
inventories and output. He concludes that expectations of
changing costs will cause no shifts in output (or buying) deci-
sions in the competitive firm and limited shifts in the conventional-
price firm, whereas managed prices bring out the full battery
of effective shifts in both the volume and timing of output. For
our purposes, the difficulty with this excellent study is that its
conclusions rest on the assumption of upward-sloping marginal
costs, and it seems highly questionable whether, in the very
short-run decisions involved in capitalizing on market prospects,
marginal costs are thought to he other than constant.
The exception might be a very large firm whose buying is of
great enough volume to influence leather prices. Buyers of such
a firm may properly visualize themselves as adding to their
stock of leather on hand and on order along an
cost curve as their buying raises the price of leather.
21 See Chapter 8, p. 95.
22 See Chapter 8, p. 104.
23 When once price lines that have been used for some time
have been changed, other changes may be made with less re-
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reading of signs and footprints. Are consumer income
and buying increasing in the aggregate? Is shoe buy-
ing increasing? Is there a tendency for consumers to
trade up by asking for higher-priced shoes than they
formerly asked for? Is there a tendency for them to
buy more than one pair of shoes at a sitting? (This is a
very bullish sign, though the multiple sale in the ho-
siery department may be a more sensitive indicator of
increasing buying power.) Where increased prices
have been tested, how have they fared? The tests may
have been made within the store. But competitors
make tests willy-nilly for one another.
The logic behind this behavior seems to posit that
consumer demand for shoes is quite sensitive to price.
Our investigations reported in Chapter 6 do not deny
the validity of this notion, though they lend it only
uncertain support. Only when consumer demand
schedules shift as a result of increasing income are re-
tailers relatively willing to advance prices. Finally, re-
tailers' behavior suggests that they believe consumers
are less sensitive to price change that takes the form
of change in quality than to price change taking the
form of overt change in price; and this certainly seems
realistic.
The same logic that makes retailers wary of raising
prices ought, it would seem, to make them interested
in reducing them in line with a drop in the cost of
manufacture. Yet I did not run across nearly as per-
sistent pressure for price decreases as is marshaled
against price increases. Certainly, here too, retailers
are interested in shifts in demand schedules associated
with drops in income that seem to require offsetting
reductions in prices. But whether they typically think
of price decreases as encouraging buying, other things
(including income) the same, seems questionable.24
At first glance, this may suggest that retailers conceive
of consumer buying as more readily discouraged by
rising prices than stimulated by falling ones, but this
is doubtless a false deduction. In deciding at what
prices to buy, considerations other than the price-
sensitivity of demand enter, and several of these may
be more important or have a different impact for rising
than for falling prices. Thus when buying prices fall,
inventory often must be marked down and the result-
ant loss on the large stocks of retail shoe stores moder-
ates the desire for lowered prices.25
24 An example of action motivated by of price
sensitivity of demand as the economist conceives it occurred
in the case of two integrated manufacturing retailers of popular-
priced shoes. Lagging demand presented the question of what
price reduction would sell enough shoes to keep the factories
operating at efficient levels.
25 The effects of fear of loss on inventory decisions are not
necessarily symmetrical to those of hope of gain. Fear of loss
would be more tellingwhen inventories are larger than desired
(as during the early months of recession) than would hope of
In general, then, the major impression seems to be
that retailers' bargaining tactics involve resisting at
least the early impact of changing costs of manufac-
ture. Fear of adverse consumer reaction to rising prices
and inventory losses when prices fall may well be the
major motives. The force of these motives lessens after
market trends have proaeeded in a given direction for
some time. Although the price paid to manufacturers
for a pair of shoes does not necessarily determine its
retail price, there seems to be a strong tendency for
retail and wholesale shoe prices to move closely to-
gether.26 Consequently retailers' willingness to change
the prices that they charge their customers will have a
strong influence on the direction and extent of price
pressure that they bring to bear on their suppliers.
During the interwar period, these pressures were sub-
stantial.
The buyer and seller, it will be recalled from Chap-
ter 2, are not unevenly matched as to size—there are
very large and very small firms in both camps. More-
over, though each transaction that is negotiated is in
part an independent bargain, it is also part of a fabric
that "makes the market." Thus, though in one sense
the big retailer is a competitor of the small retailer
and the big manufacturer a competitor of the small
manufacturer, in another sense all retailers are allies
in their struggle against manufacturers; the large firms
steam at the head of the battle array.
In the interval between the two world wars the buyer
was favored by basic economic conditions, and when
this advantage was reinforced by economic depression,
the large retailer proved a powerful antagonist indeed.
gain when stocks are smaller than desired (as during the early
months of recovery). Other considerations that may have a
different impact during recession and recovery are: (1) Knowl-
edge that the impact on manufacturers' profits of rising direct
unit costs during expansion is mitigated by the wider distribu-
tion of overhead consequent to increased output, and aware-
ness of the reverse situation during recession. This may cause
retailers to resist priôe rise in recovery and not push so hard for
price declines during recession. (2) The fight with suppliers for
power is likely also to have a different color in a buyers' than
in a sellers' market. (3) Consideration of how consumers react
to anticipated rather than actual prices may have an asymmetri-
cal cyclical impact. It is possible that retailers think that con-
sumers will hold off from buying if a fall in price causes them to
believe that prices will continue to fall; whereas the conviction
may not be so strong that consumers step up buying if a rise
in prices causes them to believe that prices will continue to rise.
In this case the unwillingness to reduce prices during recession
would not necessarily be paralleled by the readiness to increase
them in recovery.
26 The margin is not identical for all shoes in a store; some
will carry a higher markup than others. But retailers seem to
aim to achieve a predetermined average markup for a line of
shoes. Though the size of this average markup will differ for
various lines, departments, or stores, for any one of them every
effort is made to keep the figure fairly constant over time. The
fact that markdowns have a cyclical pattern thwarts this ob-
jective as far as a maintained margin is concerned.MANUFACTURERS' BUYING—i 151
"While shoe manufacturers and trade in general do not
like to admit the fact, more of them are coming to the
conclusion that the standard of value and prevailing
retail price levels are more than ever being established
by a limited number of factors who have numerous dis-
tributing units throughout the country." 27 The article
goes on to say that the popular-priced shoes which
these distributors handle are sold by manufacturers at
so small a margin that cost rises cannot be absorbed,
whereas if increases were reflected in retail prices they
would weaken the competitive position of the retailer.
But though the popular-priced shoe is certainly im-
portant in this connection, the problem affects more
than any one price range.28
In view of retailers' interest in maintaining fairly
stable prices, and their ability to urge their case effec-
tively, the smooth course of shoe prices over the years
is not surprising. In this connection, it should be re-
called (see Chapter 6) that shoe prices and the cost of
living as a whole followed quite similar courses. The
wholesale, like the retail, price of shoes is relatively in-
sensitive to subcycical fluctuations; in both, major
business fluctuations are reflected, though far more
moderately than in the price of cattle-hide leather.29
(Of course, shoe prices cannot remain unchanged when
leather prices change sharply.)
COST-SAVING DEVICES
To produce shoes at relatively stable prices, in spite
of the strong fluctuation in the price of leather and its
importance in the cost structure, the quantity and
quality of input items must be shifted.3° A glance at
27 Shoe and Leather Reporter, February 16, 1935.
28 Survey of the Shoe Industry in New Hampshire, by Agnes L.
Peterson (Women's Bureau, Dept. of Labor, Bull. 121, 1935,
p. 17), coveredtwenty-eight firms that manufactured shoes made
to retail at prices up to $10. "The cost of shoes has always figured
prominently in the success of selling, but it was stated repeatedly
that for some time shoes have been sold not according to cost of
production but under what is called a buyers' market, where the
retailer sets the price of the shoes desired and the manufacturer
must meet that price or lose the sale."
29 See Chapter 4, Chart 8 and Chapter 15, Chart 48.
30 A typical distribution of major costs for shoe manufacturing










Selling, discounts, etc. 10—20
Data from the following sources provide the basis of the figures:
Census of Manufactures; Industrial Corporation Reports, 1939,
Federal Trade Commission; Economic Data Series, No. 14,
Office of Price Administration; and L. 0. Howell, Marketing and
Manufacturing Margins for Hides and Skins, Leather and Leather
Products, Tech. Bull. 961, Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
July 1948. Detailed cost data were reported by H. A. Silverman,
"The Optimum Finn in the Boot and Shoe Industry," Oxford
Chart 24 shows how the current prices of the major
material and of the finished article have moved to-
gether over the It is easy to understand why
CHART24
Major Cost per Pair of Cattle-Hide Leather Shoes,
191 9—1 941
1919'2 123 29 '33'35 37'39
leatherprices change more, in percentage terms, than
shoe prices; they typically represent between a third
and a half of the total cost of shoes and thus can change
materially without eating into the absolute margin
for other costs and profits. But the chart suggests that
in absolute quantities, too, they typically fluctuate more
than shoe prices.
Actually, leather costs do not fluctuate as much as
the chart suggests since it is based on a fixed
and quality of leather input. The milder movements of
shoe prices are facilitated by flexibility in the specifica-
tions for shoes to be sold at a given retail price. Manu-
facturers use this flexibility to meet changing leather
prices so actual input costs do not rise as much in a
Economic Papers, April 1942, pp. 95—111, and for four shoe
firms in case studies on file at the Harvard School of Business.
The computations on which they are based are discussed in
Chapter 12. Some of the shortcomings of the calculations, a
major one of which is the assumption of fixed leather thput, are
suggested by the relation between shoe price (which is itself
based on a small sample) and the sum of the three sorts of costs.152 CHAPTER 11
rising market as would the cost of identical articles.
This means that changing leather prices are first re-
flected in shoe prices in the form of changed quality
rather than as an explicit change in price.
There is an almost infinite variety of ways in which
input may be changed. In leather, calf may be substi-
tuted for kid, kip for calf, and cattle hide for kip. A
poorer quality of leather, or one with more imperfec-
tions, may be substituted for a better quality of the
same type.32 The quality of soles, heels, shanks, linings,
and findings maybe imperceptibly changed. Or changes
in the quality of these parts may extend to a substitu-
tion of one material for another—kid linings may be
replaced with cattle-hide-split linings, which may in
turn be replaced by cloth linings. Wooden heels are
cheaper than leather heels, wooden shanks than leather
or steel shanks, composition soles than leather soles.
Large economies, particularly in the manufacture of
women's shoes, may be effected through changes in the
amount of handwork incorporated in the design. In a
sense, the product also includes services to retailers
which may be curtailed when necessary: credit, return
privileges, a large assortment of in-stock models, short
delivery periods. Some of the manufacturers' changes
will not ordinarily be recognized by retail-store buy-
ers,88 but many will be undertaken and agreed on after
consultation. Most will not be recognized as cost-saving
devices by the final consumer—at least for a while.
Conversely, a fall in costs may for a time be accom-
panied by changes of an opposite sort.
Another source from which changing unit costs may
be met is the overhead type of expense. Often margins
between direct costs and selling prices diminish just
when the volume of output rises, and vice versa. Over-
head per unit has the opposite pattern and thus pro-
vides a shock absorber. Finally, even were total unit
costs of all sorts to rise (both absolutely and relatively)
more than selling price as output increases, and profit
margins accordingly to diminish per unit or per dollar
of output, the larger volume of output might neverthe-
less cause aggregate profits and profits per dollar of in-
vested capital to increase. These statements may be re-
phrased to apply to times of diminishing sales, costs,
and selling prices.
32 A certain amount of upgrading of leather presumably takes
place in a falling market, and downgrading in a rising market.
Hence statistics of leather prices may understate the true am-
plitude of fluctuation for identical quality of product. But poor-
quality leather involves more waste in cutting and takes longer
to cut, so the economies accruing through the buying of cheaper
grades of leather are limited.
83 A shoe manufacturer illustrated how he could reduce the
cost of a pair of shoes 25 cents without most retail buyers
noticing the changes: reducing the number of nails in the sole,
setting the edging once instead of twice, using a paper instead
of a leather insole, painting instead of staining the bottom,
lengthening the stitches.
Once prices for the seasons' lines have been deter-
mined, manufacturers are loath to change them. If
prices have risen, early buyers will sometimes be
offered the old prices on their preseason orders. But
otherwise it is considered poor policy to change prices
in the course of a season. At least this is standard prac-
tice, though deviations occur, especially for individual
customers. In order to determine how to design the
season's line so as to earn an adequate profit, it is
necessary to make a guess at what each major cost will
average over the season. To make this guess for leather
costs, it is necessary to make it for leather prices. But
if leather prices rise, a shoe designed and priced to
permit leather to be bought right along as it is re-
quired will have a higher price or poorer quality than
one for which leather was bought early. This will put
the former shoe at a competitive disadvantage. In
other words, per unit margin between the price paid
for leather and received for shoes depends on the re-
lationship between three things: the actual leather cost
for the season, the leather cost assumed in the de-
sign of the line of shoes, and the competitive sound-
ness of the assumptions.
Since selling prices are hard to change over the
season and the price of leather changes often, the shoe
manufacturer is forced to take a position on anticipated
leather prices, and he does this implicitly by failing
to buy ahead quite as much as he does so explicitly by
buying ahead. Consequently, one would expect him
to consider the matter squarely and act in accordance
with his best judgment.
Combining what we have learned about margins,
about market prospects, and about the problem of
providing the material required for shoe orders actu-
ally on hand or expected within the planning horizon,
we envisage a fairly clear period of optionduring
which the leather to be used in the manufacture of
the current line may be bought. Just how the option
is exercised—and it must be exercised implicitly if
not explicitly—depends significantly on market pros-
pects with respect to delivery conditions and leather
prices (both what the prospects are thought to be and
how firm the belief is). In all probability, a period
of option of this sort leads to more shifts in owner-
ship position than is likely to be found in an industry,
of which cattle-hide tanning is an illustration, where
selling prices have a sensitive association to current
costs of the materials. The review of shoe manufactur-
ers' problems also suggests that shifts in the size of
stocks on hand or on order respond to the changing
level of orders for shoes both directly and through
the influence of the volume of sales on market expecta-
tions. Finally, the shifts appear to be subject to limit-
ing influences of several sorts.